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Abstract
This article envisions, and argues for, what I call a problematic-based curriculum approach
(PBCA) in which students work with/on knowledge in relation to local lifeworld problems
that matter. In the process, students and teachers would extend curriculum work beyond
school walls, engaging with diverse knowledgeable actors – ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ – in relation
to mattering problems. In outlining PBCA, I draw significantly on Vygotskyan thought,
including the Funds of Knowledge approach to curriculum design, and on Isabelle Stengers’
pragmatist arguments for a proactive politics of knowledge in which ‘expertise’ proliferates.
The article also contrasts PBCA with the Social Realist approach to curriculum (SR) that
underpins South Africa’s Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statements (CAPS). In this
contrast, I argue that SR/CAPS is re-formative, whereas CPBA would be trans-formative in
Nancy Fraser’s sense of “chang[ing] the deep grammar” that frames curriculum, towards
robust and vitally needed social-educational justice.
Introduction: Aiming to transform the curriculum
frame
[T]he transformative politics of framing aims to change the deep
grammar of frame-setting in a globalizing world. (Fraser 2009, p. 23)
This article outlines what I call a problematic-based curriculum approach, in
which students work with/on knowledge in relation to local lifeworld
problems that matter (problematics). In the process, students and teachers
extend curriculum work beyond school walls, engaging with diverse
knowledgeable actors –‘lay’ and ‘expert’ – in relation to mattering problems.
I argue that this curriculum approach is trans-formative, not merely re-
formative, in Nancy Fraser’s sense of “chang[ing] the deep grammar” that
frames curriculum.
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As a social philosopher, Fraser (2009) derives principles for practice of robust
justice in conditions of the present-becoming-future. She seeks justice that is
inclusive and egalitarian in terms of: (a) redistributing material and cultural
resources needed for good lives; (b) recognising cultural histories and
practices of diverse groups in the institutional formations within which they
are subjected; and (c) participatory-democratic representing of diverse social
groups in processes that define and enact the ways, means and norms for ‘a
good life’. Fraser finds that, in current globalising contexts, not only are
historically inherited institutional norms becoming precariously unsettled, but
social-structural inequalities of power and wellbeing are intensifying. Thus,
says Fraser (2009, p. 158), “I can’t ever remember such a dark period in my
lifetime”, whereby it is “a crucial job for the critical theorist to reflect on the
historical situation one inhabits, to ask oneself: What do the times ‘demand’?
What are the challenges, the opportunities, the perils?”
To address such questions requires analysis of severe barriers to robust
justice, and pragmatism about how to proceed in redressing barriers. Such
‘pragmatism’, however, is not as the term is commonly inflected in
mainstream political discourse: e.g. “don’t make ‘perfect’ the enemy of
‘possible’” (paraphrasing Obama) – which calls to limit pursuit of change to
what ‘realities’ (simplistically defined) allow. Such low-common-
denominator ‘realism’ pushes, at best, towards ameliorative re-formation
rather than radical (getting to the root of what matters) trans-formation. In
the philosophical register in which I see Fraser, and myself, as ‘pragmatist’, I
define the term as practical pursuit of what works to achieve what, in ethical
terms, is worth working towards.
Proper pragmatism is thus driven by an ethical impulse. Fraser’s
“transformative politics of framing” expresses such ethical-pragmatic impulse
to fathom critically, in order of pro-act beyond, historically received limits.
“The problematic of framing”, says Fraser (2009, p. 2; original italics), hinges
on the ethically charged question: “What, if anything, should delimit the
bounds of justice?” (ibid; italics added). Present limits on possibilities for
future justice are not only material but also epistemological, encoded in taken-
for-granted assumptions – Fraser’s “deep grammars” – historically
sedimented into features of institutions such as schools. Hence, a job for
critical theorists – including critical curriculum thinkers – is to articulate and
interrogate underpinning assumptions of present frames, in relation to ethical
principles and proactive possibilities, with intent to further ethical-practical
impetus toward trans-formative social justice.
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Deep grammars codify institutionally through histories of power struggle.
They thus correlate with deep structures of social-relational power
asymmetry. Schooling, as a key institution within social formations, and
curriculum as a key ‘message system’ within schooling (Bernstein, 1975),
thus encode tacit grammars that, deeply sedimented, are most difficult to
change (Tyack & Tobin, 1994). Pursuing transformation of deep grammars
runs against a thick matrix of deflective, refractive and cooptative forces that
tend to conserve coded grammars, in turn reproducing power inequalities
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). However, curriculum – as a locus of high-
stakes contestation over what/whose needs and aspirations schooling
addresses – attracts ongoing vigorous effort not just to preserve power of
some social groups relative to others, but political momentums to transform
grammars – which, in times (such as now) of acute unsettlement, gain
possibility. 
Curriculum is formulated, and contested, most directly at government policy
levels. As such, curriculum can appear to change relatively quickly, if we
think in a time-scale of policy re-form cycles. However, if we think in a time-
scale of powerful sedimentation, and possible trans-formation, deep
grammars encoded in curriculum tend, within all the policy flux, to resist
change. Curriculum policy shifts issuing from governments, such as national
curricula, tend – with all their fanfare of ‘major reform’ – not to dent deep
codifications that select for (re)production of inequalities.
Indeed, curriculum reforms in the time-scale of political cycles can tend
towards pendulous bipolarity around two sides of a coin of deep grammars
that does not change. In the next section I argue that post-apartheid South
African (SA) curriculum policy reforms display just such coin-conserving
binariness. Ensuing sections pursue this article’s primary project: an ethical-
pragmatic rationale for a problematic-based curriculum approach. I build,
first, on a Vygotskyan curriculum logic, which I then extend via the
‘experimental constructivist’ thought of Isabelle Stengers, a pragmatist
philosopher of science. In conclusion, I argue that a problematic-based
approach holds grammar-transforming potentials to advance social-
educational needs and aspirations of all learners, and especially power-
marginalised groups that constitute so much of SA’s population, through
robust cultural inclusion and participatory parity (Fraser, 2009) that, as Fraser
suggests, “the times ‘demand’”.
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The bi-polar coin of post-apartheid curriculum
reforms
Given textual space limits, I here provide only a very abbreviated tracing of
shifts in post-apartheid curriculum reform. My focus – as central to this
article’s argument – is on a bi-polarity regarding use, versus rejection, of
‘everyday knowledge’ within curriculum.
After the ‘long walk’ to 1994’s Mandela/ANC government, post-colonial
impulses for ethical renewal included curriculum for greater social justice – in
terms of both cultural recognition of the diverse majority of power-
marginalised peoples under apartheid (recognitive justice), and education for
capacities by which a broader range of citizens could realise economic
wellbeing (redistributive justice). Hence, says Slonimsky (2016, p. 38), “[t]he
first post-apartheid curriculum explicitly aimed to promote the political goals
of equity, redress, a culture of human rights, democratic citizenship and social
justice and the skills and dispositions necessary for individual and social
economic development”.
Such justice aims both led to, and dissipated within, a comprehensive reform,
Curriculum 2005 (C2005), introduced in 1997. C2005 framed social-justice
orientations within the neoliberal cast of 1990s ‘development’ and
‘globalisation’ discourse. SA policy makers, looking to the USA, UK and
Australia, borrowed an Outcome-Based Education (OBE) design for C2005,
defining ‘outcomes’ in terms of competences (Jansen, 2002; Fataar, 2006). In
educating structurally less-powerful groups, aims to instil economic skills and
dispositions translated to a vocational – as against academic – focus. As
observed by Fataar (2006), a lack of coherent curriculum architecture, and a
bits-and-pieces approach to naming and including ‘everyday competences’,
inhibited social-justice aims to build meaningful cultural knowledge from the
lives of diverse social groups into curriculum. ‘Everyday knowledge’, says
Fataar (2006, p. 649), thus became an object of overly simplistic, equal-but-
opposite criticisms about “over-emphasis on everyday knowledge” at cost of
“undervaluing of formal school knowledge”. A government review in 2000,
notes Fataar (ibid, p. 656), targeted “Curriculum 2005’s emphasis on
everyday knowledge” as a “weak conceptual framing” that “impeded
conceptual progression”; hence, “[t]he review accorded pride of place to …
formal school knowledge acquisition as central to the developmental role of
the school curriculum”.
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In 2012, the swing to ‘formal knowledge’ became official and firm in a new
national curriculum policy: the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statements
(CAPS). In logic and implementation, CAPs departs sharply from C2005.
Against using ‘everyday knowledge’ in curriculum, CAPS virtually excludes
it (as I discuss shortly). Also, whereas C2005 left much pedagogically open
for teachers to determine at the classroom level, by contrast, observes
Slonimsky (2016, p. 33): “CAPS is highly prescriptive of content, method and
pacing, and has arguably closed down spaces for teacher discretion”. In
Slonimsky’s Kantian philosophical terms, CAPS effects excessive
“heteronomy”, i.e. “authority from outside”; whereas C2005 effected
excessive “autonomy”, i.e. “authority from the inside”, for which teachers –
too soon after decades of heteronomous habits, cultured in apartheid teacher-
education and school practice – were not ready.
I find Slonimsky’s distinction – autonomy/heteronomy – analytically useful in
indicating a dimension of the bi-polarity of post-apartheid national shifts in
curriculum policy. Against such polarised swings, Slonimsky appeals for
policy and teacher-education that supports flexible balancing along “a
continuum between heteronomy and autonomy” (ibid, p. 38), such that
teachers can both operate within sensibly authoritative regulations and
exercise creative pedagogic determinations emergent from their autonomous
agency in situations of classroom work. Otherwise (ibid), “[t]oo much
regulation and stability constrains initiative and an imagination for the
possible”, but “[t]oo few limits result in extreme anxiety (anomie) or extreme
detachment (egoism)”.
I argue further that neither C2005’s unclarified conception of ‘everyday’
knowledge, nor CAPS’ prescriptive disciplinary content and pacing/testing,
actually interrupt how schools serving power-elite populations reproduce their
students’ social-positional power through schooling. Schools with histories of
strong academic results, linked to powerful structural positions and associated
cultural capital of students inhabiting them, typically retain much relative
autonomy to continue with, and innovate further on, curricular and pedagogic
approaches that have ‘proven successful’. Rigorous accountability for
following scripts of either C2005 or CAPS is more apt to apply in schools
inhabited by power-marginalised groups who are likely to be alienated by
culturally unfamiliar curriculum and pedagogy.
To be fair, the theory underpinning CAPS is not perfectly translated in CAPS
policy or practice. However, the theory poses problems too, I argue, hinging
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on the key curriculum issue of what/whose knowledge counts. I accord with
Slonimsky’s affirmation (2016 in what follows) that knowledge is a
“constitutive condition for autonomy” (p. 40) in culturing teacher and student
capacities for “reason, critical reflection, deliberation and initiative in a …
morally acceptable [to communities] manner” (p. 32). However, a vital
question becomes: What/whose knowledge, worked with/upon in what ways,
can culture such critical-ethical capacities? Slonimsky valorises “disciplinary
knowledge” (p. 36), i.e. “specialised forms of knowledge necessary for
critique” (p. 32), as warranted in “Durkheim’s social realist science of
morality” (p. 36; my emphasis). This valorisation of Social Realism (SR)
raises what, to me, is the more vexing bi-polarity of post-apartheid curriculum
reforms: C2005’s positive valuation, followed by CAPS’s negative valuation,
of ‘everyday knowledge’ as useful for school curriculum work. 
SR is an academic movement of high influence in the conceptual formulation
of CAPS. As to what knowledge should be used in curriculum, SR argues in
terms of Durkheim’s distinction between ‘sacred’ (disciplinary) and ‘profane’
(everyday) social bases of knowledge, and Bernstein’s (1999) parallel
distinction between ‘vertical’ (disciplinary) and ‘horizontal’ (everyday)
knowledge modes. I lack space to amplify SR concepts and rationales (see
Zipin, Fataar & Brennan, 2015, and Edwards, 2014, who elaborate arguments
by key SR authors, in articles critical of these arguments). I focus here on how
SR valorises ‘disciplinary’ as against ‘everyday’ knowledge. As Young
(2014, p. 62) puts it: “[Curriculum that] celebrates the experience of pupils,
whatever that may be … [goes against] the idea that the purpose of schools is
to introduce them to knowledge beyond their experience”. In more theoretical
vocabulary, Young says (2008, p. 89; italics added):
Bernstein’s distinction between vertical and horizontal knowledge structures … assumes
that … the codes and practices associated with subjects and disciplines … are designed to
set the curriculum apart from the everyday knowledge that students bring to school … [I]t
is this separation of the curriculum from everyday life that gives the knowledge acquired
through it an explanatory power and capacity for generalization that is not a feature of
everyday knowledge tied to practical concerns…. Certain principles for guiding curriculum
policy necessarily follow … [e.g.] curriculum cannot be based on everyday practical
experience. Such a curriculum would only recycle that experience. 
As remarked above, the ‘everyday knowledge’ upheld in C2005 lacked
epistemological clarity in policy texts, in school practice, and in attacks by
critics who, like Young, saw it to offer only deficits for school learning.
However, in ensuing sections I argue that there are richly meaningful
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knowledge processes in family and community lifeworlds of power-
marginalised (and all) students, which, if put into dialectical interaction with
disciplinary knowledge, hold great asset potential for curriculum work that
extends learners’ capacities for explanatory power far beyond what they
already experience (which, for that matter, is not static in everyday life). I
argue that curriculum which valorises either disciplinary or everyday
knowledge, to the exclusion of the other: (a) weakens the knowledge, and its
learning value, that is given polarised valorisation; and (b) sustains the frame
of deep grammars by which curriculum work unjustly reproduces social-
structural inequalities.
The life of knowledge and curriculum
[T]here [should] exist within the very nature of the educational
process … as close an interaction, with life itself as might be wished
for. Ultimately only life educates, and the deeper that life burrows into
the school, the more dynamic and the more robust will be the
educational process. That the school has been … walled in … from life
itself has been its greatest failing. Education is just as meaningless
outside the … [life]world as is a fire without oxygen, or as breathing in
a vacuum. The teacher’s educational work, therefore, must be
inevitably connected with his [or her] creative social and life work.
(Vygotsky, 1997, p. 345; cited in Moll, 2014, pp. 120–121)
“Ultimately only life educates”: so, curriculum should be designed for life-
based knowledge to burrow deeply in, rather than wall it off. Notably,
Vygotsky conceives what is embodied in socio-cultural life beyond school as
importantly creative; and he calls for its deep connection with educational
processes among both students and teachers. Clearly, Vygotsky sees vital
powers stemming from use of life-based knowledge in curriculum work,
rather than – as per Young – keeping curriculum separate from everyday
knowledge and its practical concerns.
However, Vygotskyan curriculum does not valorise everyday knowledge to
the exclusion of specialised disciplinary knowledge, the powers of which
Vygotsky also significantly valued. He conceived a dialectical “relationship in
schooling between what he called ‘spontaneous’ and ‘scientific’ concepts”,
says Moll (2014, p. 34), a leading figure in the Vygotsky-informed Funds of
Knowledge approach to curriculum design (to be discussed below).
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Spontaneous concepts emerge in the sensuousness of everyday life, as
embodied consciousness engages with natural and social worlds, mediated by
cultural tools and artefacts available in everyday lifeworlds. However,
spontaneous concepts do not cohere in refined knowledge systems; whereas
scientific concepts, says Moll, “form part of an organised system of
knowledge and thus can more easily be reflected upon and deliberately
manipulated” (ibid, p. 35). 
That is, everyday knowledge is not to be made curricular in any direct take-up
whereby, as Young worries, it does not offer capacities for generalisation.
Rather, everyday concepts are to be recontextualised for school curriculum
use – a key aspect of which is interaction with systematised bodies of
scientific (disciplinary) knowledge, from which greater powers of reflexivity,
manipulation and cogent explanation accrue. Vygotsky thus theorised
curriculum work, says Moll (ibid, p. 35), as a “relationship between scientific
and everyday concepts [that] is reciprocal”; i.e. “[t]hey mediate each other”.
However, in this dialectical reciprocity, life-based knowledge contributes not
just vitality but meaningfulness that is fundamental to the knowledge value of
scientific concepts. Says Moll (ibid; italics added): 
Everyday concepts provide the “conceptual fabric” for the development of schooled
concepts, and the everyday concepts are also transformed through their connection with the
more systematic concepts. Scientific concepts grow into the … domain of personal
experience, thus acquiring meaning and significance. However, scientific concepts bring
… conscious awareness and control, which Vygotsky believed to be essential
characteristics of schooling.
Conceiving everyday concepts as the conceptual fabric is notable. The idea is
not that schooling can make initial use of life-based knowledge, to ‘meet
learners where they start from’, but then leave everyday concepts behind as
learning progresses to specialist knowledge of ‘higher worth’. Rather, in
educative processes, specialist concepts acquire meaning and significance,
and contribute to powers of matured thought, only by virtue of growing into
domains of life experience – the conceptual fabric – and not by tearing away.
I will now begin pushing Vygotskyan knowledge dialectics further towards an
argument for a curriculum approach that focuses such dialectics around
problems that matter in locales of learners’ lives. I start with the Funds of
Knowledge approach (FK) to curriculum design, which draws on Vygotskyan
principles. FK emerged in Mexican-American populated areas of the U.S.
southwest (Vélez-Ibáñez & Greenberg, 1992; Gonzalez, Moll & Amanti,
Zipin: Pursuing a problematic-based curriculum. . .       75
2005). A typical methodology is ethnographic collaborations in which
academics and teachers together scout students’ neighbourhoods and visit
their homes, researching for “funds of knowledge”, defined as “historically
accumulated and culturally developed bodies of knowledge and skills
essential for household … [and community] functioning and well-being”
(Moll, Amanti, Neffe & Gonzalez, 1992, p. 133).
After their research, teacher-academic teams review the ethnographic data for
life-based knowledge with worthy potentials for recontextualising into
curriculum units linked to school subjects. It is important to appreciate the
purposeful selectivity in this process (as compared to C2005’s unclear senses
of ‘everyday knowledge’, left too much to teachers alone to figure out). FK
curriculum design seeks knowledge put to richly meaningful socio-cultural
use in lifeworlds of, say, Arizona’s Mexican-American communities, or Cape
Flats communities of South Africa, as resources for “transforming students’
diversities into [curricular and] pedagogical assets” (Moll & Gonzalez, 1997,
p. 89). Lifeworlds of power-marginalised groups are thus not seen as social
spaces of cultural deficit that schools must bracket out: not “as places from
which children must be saved” but “that, in addition to problems (as in all
communities), contain valuable knowledge and experiences that can foster ...
educational development” (ibid, p. 98).
Indeed, problems that vex community life can resource robust learning assets:
what Zipin (2009, 2013; also Zipin, Sellar & Hattam, 2012) calls “dark funds
of knowledge”, about which students from power-marginalised groups can
prove surprisingly literate to teachers. Such lived problems can spur powerful
spontaneous thought in the conceptual repertoires of students, their families
and communities. Thus, say Moll et al. (1992, pp. 133–134):
 
Our approach also involves studying how household members use their funds of knowledge
in dealing with changing, and often difficult, social and economic circumstances … [and]
develop social networks that interconnect them with their social environments … [in]
multiple spheres of activity within which the child is enmeshed.
As Moll et al. suggest, deeply problematic conditions – e.g. declining youth
employment, ecosystem damage, gang violence, etc. – in locales where
students’ lives are enmeshed: (a) emergently change over time, inciting
ongoing labours of thought and learning; and (b) are never simply ‘local’ but
link to broader social-structural dynamics. Such global-in-local problems
hold potentials to interconnect students in expanded networks of knowledge
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co-labour with teachers, community members and disciplinary specialists
beyond schools. In the next section, I push further towards a problematic-
based curriculum approach (CPBA), in taking up Isabelle Stengers’
pragmatist arguments for putting proliferated expertise to work on mattering
problems.
Problematics that gather, proliferate and deepen
knowledge
We are talking of a problem ‘that gathers together’, not of a problem to
be resolved. (Pignarre & Stengers, 2011, p. 112) 
Each place that it was forbidden to enter, where it was thought neutral,
objective experiments, independent of the uses that would be made of
them, were being constructed, becomes a place that it is henceforth
imperative to penetrate so as to make expertise proliferate, so as to
imagine new ways of creating commonality among competences,
indeed of rehabilitating excluded competences. (ibid, p. 85) 
I quote from Capitalist Sorcery by Philippe Pignarre and Isabelle Stengers
(henceforth P&S): a journalist and activist in struggles of poor populations to
access affordable medicines (Pignarre), and a pragmatist philosopher of
science (Stengers). In Stengers’ writing (solo and co-authored), she develops
arguments, concepts and strategies for a politics of democratic science that
generates informed publics in putting knowledge to work on situated
problems (with broader implications) that matter to people’s life-based needs
and aspirations.
Such situations, suggest P&S, gather actors from diverse standpoints of
social-cultural knowledge in relation to the problematic. That is, a mattering
problem is the attractor that assembles varied actors, all of whom – whether
with ‘lay’ experience of living the problem, or in ‘specialist’ areas relevant to
it – are seen as bearers of knowledge with potential use-value for working on
the problem. This includes “knowledges and techniques of professional
researchers”, say P&S (p. 86), “but they wouldn’t be in command”. Rather, all
are accorded participatory-democratic agency on equal footing, yet
appreciated distinctly for what, in their re-combinational diversity, they bring
to the problem. Knowledge thus transacts in educative reciprocity, as different
stakeholders mutually inform each others’ perspectives, working towards
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more complex purchase on the problem, with all whom the problem gathers
nurturing humility – an attitude of “apprenticeship” (P&S, pp. 78ff) – about
what they know, what is yet to learn, and from whom. Such inclusive, non-
hierarchical respect for proliferated expertise rehabilitates varied
competences. Indeed, compared to Outcome-Based Education’s vague sense
of ‘competences’, P&S reclaim a robust sense of proactive capabilities
(knowledge-abilities) to contribute to work on problems that matter.
The principle of inclusive proliferation is both ethical in its democratic
impulse, and practical in its methodo-logic for pursuing ‘solutions’. From the
premise that mattering problems are complex and emergent, the argument is
that social sources of knowledge which may offer powerful knowledge
towards working ‘solutions’ are more diversely proliferated than the specialist
communities that Durkheimian Social Realists deem ‘sacred’. The logic, then,
is to expand, rather than contract, connections across knowledge sources that
can elucidate the problem: to “honor the making of connections”, says
Stengers (2012, n/p). As Nicolini (2012, p. 216), discussing Stengers, puts it:
“[G]ood science is generative, not eliminativist: its goal is to increase our
capacity to make connections among phenomena, not to eradicate interesting
features in the name of generalization”. Hence, sources from whence
knowledge may improve purchase on the problem cannot be presumed in
advance. “In all these cases”, say P&S (p. 86), “the connections do not pre-
exist, they have to be created”.
By this logic, putting knowledge to work on a problematic – which both uses
and (re)makes knowledge – generates working solutions, not definitive
resolution, as the problem is too complex and unfolding to yield a ‘once-for-
all’ reckoning. Nor can working solutions for emergent problems derive
simply from a priori principles or precedents. Thus Stengers (2012, n/p) urges
us not to work from “models and norms” that frame problems narrowly, but
rather to nurture “empirical and pragmatic concern about effects and
consequences”. As P&S (p. 17) define it: “Pragmatism is an art of
consequences, an art of ‘paying attention’”. To this aesthetic sense of good
science as artfully attentive practice, Stengers (2011, p. 12) adds an ethical
sense of care: “Pragmatism is the care of the possible”: it frees our work
towards emergent futures from overly narrowing fixations on past as
precedent, sustaining a sense of possibility for change at Fraser’s frame-
transforming level of depth. Recalling my discussion of ‘pragmatism’ early in
this article: Stengers conceives an ethical-pragmatic science, attentive to
what works for pursuing what is worth working towards.
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I note that Social Realists reject the pragmatist attitude, arguing that emphasis
on diverse practical uses of knowledge dilutes the generalisability that gives
disciplinary knowledge its coherence and explanatory power. Says Young
(2008, p. 66): “Vygotsky’s emphasis on social activity … preclude[s] him
from treating knowledge as … separate from its uses … [which is]
Durkheim’s key point in his critique of pragmatism”. And (ibid, p. 70): “For
Durkheim ... [the] power [of knowledge] could never arise out of its
usefulness in terms of satisfying specific needs”. Regarding the question of
what knowledge is curriculum-worthy, Young’s gist is that to mix life-based
and disciplinary knowledge debilitates the organising powers of the latter,
devolving thought processes towards an undisciplined, ‘anything goes’
relativism. I have already argued, via Vygotsky, that if curriculum links life-
based and disciplinary knowledge dialectically, the latter infuses its
systematising powers into the conceptual fabric without losing potency, while
in turn gaining meaningful significance. (See Zipin et al., 2015, for more
amplification of this debate.) I here argue further that, when a mattering
problem draws diverse knowledges to it, its centripetal pull generates
organisation. Moreover, with artful attention on the problem, knowledge
diversities are all tested as to whether/how they provide insight and proactive
possibility regarding the problem. Stengerian proliferation of expertise thus
does not run to relativism, since the gravity of the problematic is selective for
what knowledge is gathered and held in bounds.
 
In the previous section, by way of Vygotsky/Moll and the Funds of
Knowledge approach, I argued a rationale for building curriculum around
dialectical interactions of life-based and disciplinary knowledge. In this
section, by way of Stengerian pragmatism, I extended the Vygotsky/FK logic
to a rationale for building knowledge dialectics around problems that matter
in locales of students’ lives. However, principles for connecting such
problematics to school curriculum need explication, as does the claim that
such an approach furthers robust social justice that transforms reproductive
framings. These are tasks for the next section.
Towards problematic-based curriculum
In this section, I aim to outline principles for curriculum that develops
knowledge-abilities in working on problems that matter in students’ locales. I
here draw significantly on an article by Sarah Whatmore and Catharina
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Landström (henceforth W&L): ‘Flood apprentices: an exercise in making
things public’ (2011; unless otherwise indicated, quotes below are from this
article, with only page numbers provided). W&L discuss a situation where
proliferated expertise gathered to work on a problem of chronic river floods,
affecting people in/around the town of Pickering in the Ryedale district of
England’s North Yorkshire region. This case of problematic-driven
knowledge work did not involve schools. However, in deriving principles
from W&L’s account, I apply them to a problematic-based curriculum
approach.
W&L were part of a multi-disciplinary network of academics, concerned with
issues of rural economy and land use, and attentive for sites where local
populations had become aroused to want other than ‘official-expert-only’
solutions to problems. This was the case in Pickering after engineering
consultants, contracted by a government Environment Agency (EA), issued a
report recommending that a floodwall be built through the town, which the
EA promoted “as the solution circulated as expert knowledge” (p. 592; italics
in original). However, the Pickering & District Civic Society, a volunteer
organisation, gathered expressions of “local disagreements … when this was
put out for public consultation” (p. 588), questioning whether the floodwall
would address all matters in which citizens had stakes, “thereby challenging
the expert knowledge claims that underpinned the initial EA proposal”
(p. 589).
This emergent politics of knowledge drew W&L’s team of “social and natural
scientists” to the scene, with the aim of “working collaboratively with people
affected by flooding … to interrogate the science that informs local flood
management and intervene in the public controversy to which it had given
rise” (p. 582). Collaboration took form in a Ryedale Flood Research Group
(RFRG). In what follows I do not detail the history or science of the flood
controversy (as W&L do in their article). My focus is on passages that
amplify Stengerian elements of the RFRG’s work on a mattering problem,
which I translate to curriculum principles, at once ethical and strategic.
(Within space limits, I can give these principles only minimal pedagogic
translation, leaving it to readers’ to imagine putting them into practice in
specific school contexts.)
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Focussing on molten matters that attract and force thought
Michel Callon’s ‘hot situations’ (1998), Bruno Latour’s ‘matters of
concern’ (2004a) and Isabelle Stengers’ ‘things that force thought’
(2005a) … provide vocabularies for addressing those moments of
ontological disturbance in which the things on which we rely as
unexamined parts of the material fabric of our everyday lives become
molten. (p. 583)
For student energies to be drawn to knowledge work on problematics, the
problems selected for curriculum focus must really matter in lifeworld
milieus. In the above passage, W&L cite philosophers of science, including
Stengers, who define such concerns in a language of ‘materiality’ and
consciousness-raising ‘heat’. That is: a mattering problem substantively
disturbs resources, infrastructures and other materialities that people tacitly
count on to sustain life; and such social-ontological disturbance to “the
material fabric” of everyday life incites epistemic molten-ness in Vygotsky’s
‘conceptual fabric’, such that unexamined dimensions of lived conditions boil
up into thought.
Curriculum work that builds around mattering problems thus extends thought
in new ways and degrees. Contrary to Young’s earlier-cited claim that
“curriculum … based on everyday practical experience … would only recycle
that experience”, focus on life-based problems quickens awareness and reach
of Vygotsky’s ‘spontaneous concepts’, catalysing capacity for dialectical
interaction with disciplinary concept-systems. Making such problems
curricular thus “forces thought” – which, in Stengers’ terms, does not mean
external authoritative demand on learners (Slonimsky’s ‘heteronomy’: e.g. ‘It
will be on the test; so study it.’), but that an attracting problematic impels
thought-activation. 
Redistributing expertise; building collective competences
[T]he experimental research apparatus we draw upon here – the
‘competency group’ (CG)4 – … [puts] Stengers’ experimental
constructivism into research practice. CGs are forums for
collaborative thinking designed to … highlight the connections between
scientific work and other types of activities … [and] generate new
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collective competences in handling the uncertainties of flood-risk
knowledge and redistribute expertise. (p. 586)
For students to develop knowledge-abilities to think and pro-act, pedagogic
contexts should be rich in knowledge presence and transaction, connected to
meaningful work on matters of compelling interest. There are inevitable limits
to school-based teachers’ expertise across (a) multi-disciplinary knowledges;
and (b) how things are known, and what matters, in students’ lifeworlds. Why
not, then, bring students and their school-based teachers into milieus that
redistribute expertise across a wider range of pedagogic agents? Problems that
both matter in local communities, and connect to broader structural issues,
present opportune scenes for proliferation of pedagogic actors who – in
learning-from/teaching each other – expand collective knowledge
competences. This is the methodo-logic for calling the RFRG’s research
apparatus a “competency group”: a term, as W&L explain in footnote #4
(embedded in the above quote), adapted “from the notion of ‘competent
publics’ in a web essay by Stengers on ‘sustainable development’” (p. 606).
To initiate the RFRG, W&L’s network used local press advertisements “for
recruits to join an ‘experimental research forum’ on flooding in Ryedale” 
(p. 592). Schools cannot expect such fortuitous occurrences of academic
specialists taking initiative to gather distributed expertise around a mattering
local problem to which they could link. However, students and school staff
could act as instigators, using Funds of Knowledge methods – ethnographic
forays in local community settings; classroom discussion of what they find;
and so on – to identify molten life matters. They could investigate whether
such matters have drawn attention from disciplinary specialists, and/or contact
specialist and civic organisations, and canvass across family and community
networks, seeking ‘competency group’ participants. By such activist means,
students and teachers can recognise their agency to affect futures regarding
problems that matter for their lives with others, learning to see themselves not
as mere knowledge receivers, but as socially collaborative knowledge
creators.
Thus to cast curriculum as knowledge-creating co-labour is, I suggest, frame-
changing for students, teachers and schools. In social-justice terms, it is
especially vital for learners from power-marginalised groups, who too-
typically ‘learn’ – from schooling’s hidden-curricular messages – that they
lack ‘inborn’ potentials for effective agency in social life. That work on
mattering problems is necessarily knowledge-creative is indicated in W&L’s
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claim (above) that such work cultivates new competences in handling
uncertainties. Given the emergent (and emergence-y) nature of problems such
as Pickering’s floods, conceptions of ‘problem’ and ‘solution’ are necessarily
experimental, at-work, under construction: hence Stengers’ “experimental
constructivism”.
Slowing down reasoning; framing problems alternatively 
[F]or Stengers, emergent publics are induced by generative events …
in which … problems that ‘slow down reasoning’ make a difference.
(p. 584) 
Staging the CG experiment in the context of this extant [flood]
controversy, our aim … was to ‘slow down’ reasoning by creating a
space in which the expert knowledge claims that informed the flood
wall proposal could be more closely interrogated, and residents moved
by the event … could try out alternative ways of framing and
addressing the problem … informed by their experiences. (p. 589)
Experimental grasp on thought and action in the heat of generative events
requires frame-changing in another dimension: time. Curriculum work needs
to abandon rush-paced syllabi – as in CAPS and most national curricula – that
push teachers and students to ‘keep up’. A matter that forces thought
correlatively compels thought to slow down, such that learning is framed as a
problem-regarding cultural process of dynamic knowledge-making (Gutiérrez
& Rogoff , 2003), wherein learners see themselves as knowledge co-workers
among others “moved by the event”. This does not disregard acquisition and
use of content knowledge linked to school subjects that bear on a problem. As
already discussed, learning is enriched in a pedagogic milieu of both
community-resident and discipline-based ‘teachers’ (from within and beyond
school walls). However, the emergent nature of a problematic event makes
controversial all knowledge that it gathers, including from disciplinary
experts. All gathered knowledge needs pragmatic testing – not by specialists
‘sacredly’ aloof from ‘profane’ life-residency, but in a competency-group
milieu of redistributed ‘expertise’ – in terms of how it contributes to grasping
a problem in its complexities and uncertainties that compel slowed-down
collaborative reasoning.
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Slowing down thought is key to curriculum development of a vital collective
competence: to “try out alternative ways of framing … the problem” in
dialogue that hears, considers and interrogates, in relation to the problematic,
“experiences and observations” from diversely situated others. Culturing such
knowledge-practicing capacity to open the framing of mattering problems is
indeed a frame-changing virtue of the competency-group approach. 
Reconfiguring the ethics of knowledge work 
Local group members’ visceral experience of the recent flood event and
frustrated dealings with the flood-risk ‘experts’ charged our collective
flood apprenticeship with a keen sense of urgency … [to] reconfigure
flooding expertise among group members. Working with brought
objects (such as maps, photos, satellite images … a piece of mouldy
carpet) … to situate each member’s attachments to the event … helped
to dissociate the ‘university’ members from the normal networks
constitutive of their authority. (p. 593)
[O]ne of the group’s university members … is quoted [in a local
newspaper] as saying ‘“The people who live with flooding know as
much, if not more, as scientists like me”’ … [A local member] said it
had been a “‘true collaboration” between local people with local
knowledge and academics who were experts in the field of flooding
issues’. (pp. 597–598)
I argue that curriculum is, crucially, about cognitive-and-ethical development.
My hyphens signify ‘cognitive’ and ‘ethical’ as inextricable dimensions of all
knowledge work (see Zipin et al., 2015 for fuller argument). In cognitive
terms, W&L reflect the Vygotskyan premise that lifeworlds are sources of
rich “visceral” (spontaneous) concepts for meaningful inter-elucidation with
disciplinary concept systems. W&L’s Stengerianism highlights the ethical
point that curriculum work ought to encourage learners not to defer when,
viscerally, they register dissonance with ‘official’ knowledge claims.
Curriculum work on a mattering problem should teach that knowledge
controversies are agentic opportunities to bring visceral sense into conceptual
articulation, in dialogue (including debate) with bearers of disciplinary
concepts, aiming to advance collective sophistication regarding the problem.
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Another cognitive feature of Vygotskyan curriculum work is purposeful use
of mediative cultural-historical tools: “artifacts with which students
themselves are expert”, and through which, in classroom analytical practices,
“students are socialized into academic discourse as they learn more about
their familiar tools and practices, as well as about unfamiliar and even
alienating canonical texts” (Gutiérrez, Morales & Martinez, 2009, p. 231).
The RFRG made just such use of artefacts to, as W&L say, “situate each
member’s attachments to the event” and – with Stengerian ethical import –
democratise openness to whose ‘expertise’ might prove ‘authoritative’ in
relation to the problem. In this group, comprising local and academic agents,
“brought objects” were aptly representative: from repertoires of everyday life
use (photos; bits of flood-mouldy carpet) and specialist use (satellite images).
In dialogue among members who share problem-focussed interest in each
other’s use-values, such diverse artefacts all have stories to tell, laden with
‘spontaneous’ and ‘scientific’ concepts, the interchange of which facilitates
mutual respect and educative reciprocity.
Significant in RFRG members’ reconfiguration of ‘expertise’ was an ethical
attitude of “collective flood apprenticeship” wherein all share: (a) humility in
appreciating how the unavoidably provisional grasp on an emergent and
fraught problem means that no position of attachment to the event has
automatic ‘best knowledge’ about the problem; and yet (b) courage to act as
knowledge-able contributors towards grasping the problem. Say Pignares and
Stengers (2011, p. 76–77):
Apprenticeship is not a pedagogy, it is a production of knowledge, the production of a new
type of expertise … new means of grasping a situation, leading to the production of new
ways of acting, of connecting, of being efficacious.
Across diverse RFRG members, an apprenticeship praxis supported de-
hierarchic “true collaboration” (as W&L quote a local newspaper). I suggest
that schooling for such humble-yet-agentic collective responsibility across
diversities, committed to producing new knowledge for grasping new futures,
would radically reconfigure the framing of curriculum. Indeed, it could help
to reconfigure how schools, communities and governing bodies might connect
efficaciously in a vital political-ethical project: capacitating knowledgeably
informed, participatory-democratic and justice-oriented citizenry.
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Educating for knowledge-able publics; democratising the frame of
governing mentalities
[D]iversifying the publics with whom scientists collaborate, and the
terms on which they do … facilitate[s] the emergence of new kinds of
public … capable of producing … ‘in the very process of their
emergence, the power to object and to intervene in matters which they
discover concern them’ [W&L here quote Stengers]. (p. 606)
[R]ethinking of the relationship between science and democracy …
[must attend] as closely to the practices involved in constituting
publics as to those of producing knowledge. (p. 603)
RFRG knowledge work produced an alternative to the floodwall: what
members called a bund model, which they believed took better account of
diverse local and academic concerns, experience and knowledge. “All
members of the RFRG contributed to constructing and testing the bund model
in different ways”, say W&L (p. 594). Details of this model’s differences
from the floodwall, and how it was tested, are beyond this article’s purview. I
here focus on the ethico-politics by which this alternative circulated to a
wider sociality, beyond its RFRG origins. A public exhibit/discussion,
organised by the RFRG at the Pickering Civic Centre, “attracted some 200
visitors” including local residents and “EA [Environment Agency] staff, local
politicians and journalists” (p. 596). Reference here is to the same EA that
had touted the floodwall, designed by its chosen ‘experts’, as the definitive
solution. In ensuing months, the EA fluxed between doubting the credence of
RFRG ‘lay’ members, and weighing the bund model on its merits. Meanwhile,
“[i]n the wake of the public exhibition”, say W&L (p. 599), “the bund model
… gather[ed] a public to it, multiplying the ‘actors’ and amplifying the
‘matter’ at stake”. Eventually, local and national government bodies funded
trials of the bund model, some noting possible applicability to flood situations
elsewhere: thus “the project’s significance extrapolated beyond the local
case” (p. 601).
Governing institutions, as power-loci in processes shaping ‘public
mindedness’, tend, if left to their devices, to conserve status-quo deep
grammars. Yet RFRG efficacy shows how projects moved to “amplify a
‘matter’ at stake” can stir frame-changing epistemologies into public thought.
Extending its knowledge-work to wider publics, the RFRG was politically
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persuasive that public-meets-specialist science can do better than specialist-
only. Indeed, it stood as antithesis to government and media populism that
frames public thought within ideo-logics that simplify grasp of lived
problems. In contrast, RFRG mediation both aroused and slowed down public
thought, capacitating citizens to grapple with lived complexities. Gathering
wider publics into its knowledge processes, the RFRG thus “facilitated
emergence of new kinds of public” with new knowledge-able competences.
This public-educational extension of micro-group competency incited a meso-
level of government and media actors to join processes of frame-changing
thought. Daring to be ‘utopian’, I suggest that if, across a range of social
geographies, projects for working on life-based problems emerged and linked
schooling of young people into them, this could help to transform framing
mentalities at macro-structural levels of “extrapolation beyond the local
case”.
Conclusion: Problematic-based curriculum for frame-
changing social justice 
Across the previous section, I noted what I see as the frame-transforming
ethical-pragmatic virtues of a problematic-based curriculum approach
(henceforth PBCA). In this concluding section I contrast PBCA, in ethical
terms, with the Social Realist approach (SR) underpinning South Africa’s
current CAPS national curriculum. In doing so, I draw on Nancy Fraser’s 
3-‘R’ principles for robust social justice: redistribution, recognition, and
representation. (I lack space to elaborate Fraser’s definitions and arguments.
For amplification, see Fraser, 2009; and, applied to curriculum, Zipin et al.,
2015.)
I begin with redistribution. SR proponents Maton and Moore argue (2010,
p. 10) that discipline-based curriculum works “in the service of progress and
social justice” by making “epistemologically more powerful forms of
knowledge … accessible to everyone”. As I read it, their justice claim is that
discipline-based curriculum carries superior epistemic powers to other modes
of knowledge; hence school redistribution of this ‘powerful knowledge’, such
that all learners gain access and proficiency – including those from power-
marginal social positions – will redress how schooling historically has
provided selectively greater access to learners from power-central positions.
And more equal distribution of knowledge powers will help towards
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equalising social power across all future citizens, instead of reproducing the
greater power of those already privileged.
Drawing on Vygotsky, I have argued that disciplinary knowledge by itself –
not interacting dialectically with life-based knowledge – lacks sufficient
scaffolding meaningfully to engage most power-marginalised learners. I here
note further that SR valorises redistributed access to the same knowledge for
all, on the premise that it is best for all by virtue of deriving from ‘sacred’
spaces of specialist knowledge work. SR thus redistributes culturally
assimilative knowledge, bracketing out most people’s diverse cultural
knowledge as ‘profanely’ less worthy for curriculum.
PBCA also redistributes disciplinary knowledge, but in dialectical
engagement with life-based knowledge. The premise is that, with careful
selection of rich knowledge-strands – funds of knowledge (FK) – from life-
based conceptual fabrics, people’s diverse social-cultural ways of knowing all
can contribute to rigorous knowledge work. In Stengerian extension of the FK
approach, I have argued that mattering problems test what cultural
knowledges are rich for purpose. PBCA thus claims that (re)distributing a
proliferated expertise furthers more powerful work with/on knowledge than
can ‘specialist’ expertise alone. PBCA’s concept of ‘redistribution’ thus
strikes deeper ethical registers than SR. It transforms framing grammars of
knowledge-valuation from: (a) ‘Knowledge is best if specialists are confident
in it’; to (b) ‘From our diversely competent knowledge co-labours, our
emergent consensus is that these understandings better grasp the problem’.
From different framings, SR and PBCA both aim to redistribute ‘power’ in
the sense of agency, thus attenuating ‘power’ in the sense of structurally
unequal social leverage. However, SR assimilationist stress on ‘specialist’
knowledge fails to recognise – by valued inclusion in curriculum –
knowledges of meaningful use among diverse cultural-historical groups.
Likewise, fetishising ‘specialist’ provision of knowledge fails to nurture
diversified participatory representation in social-decision processes –
including curriculum knowledge-selection. To SR, “[t]he purpose of
schooling is to specialize learners’ voice with respect to the school code”
(Hoadley, 2008, p. 65). By implication, only after initiation in specialist
knowledge codes are people fit to participate in social decisions guided by
those codes.
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By contrast PBCA – valuing diverse specialist and life-based codes, put
interactively to work in knowledge-and-action praxis – extends redistribution
into the further ‘Rs’ of inclusive cultural recognition and participatory-
democratic representation. In South Africa, where so many schools serve
students from power-marginal positions and high-poverty lifeworld
conditions, I argue it is vital that students, teachers, families and community
stakeholders are culturally recognised and democratically represented in
deciding what curriculum work can help empower their futures. And there are
abundant molten problems – in complexly intermeshed domains of
environment, employment, technology, health and social-service needs – to
attract both local and specialist expertise that, linking students in, could
provide opportune learning milieus for students to gain immersion in the
praxis of all three of Fraser’s ‘Rs’.
In this article I have made a case for curriculum frame-change in South
Africa, joining debate about what curriculum grammars are ‘best’ for SA
young learners. I must end, however, on notes of caution and humility. I
recognise that policy reforms, once initiated, take time to play out, surfacing
pros and cons to ‘iron out’. How entrenched is CAPS’ time to run, and
whether, in that time, there are spaces to experiment with PBCA-like
alternatives, I am not situated to speculate. Visits in the past few years to SA,
giving invited workshops on the Funds of Knowledge approach, and more
recently the PBCA approach, have drawn me into SA curriculum debates; but
I do not live in SA or have a lived SA history. I recognise that, in my search
in this article for ethical-pragmatic shift in curriculum framing, it is a
philosophical pragmatism that I have primarily outlined. While my argument
draws support from praxical illustrations, such as the Funds of Knowledge
track record and the RFRG experiment, these are not SA-based instances.
Nor are my instantiations African, or ‘southern’. I have indeed countered SR’s
set of ‘northern theory’ tools (Connell, 2007) with another ‘northern’ set. I do
not suggest that ‘north’ has nothing to offer ‘south’, or that ‘global south’ is
utterly distinct from ‘global north’. These can be overly generic categories,
essentialising ‘wholes’ from ‘parts’ that do not simply reduce to them; and
elements of ‘south’ and ‘north’ have formed over long histories of complex
interaction. Yet the distinction remains analytically important, recognising
that epistemologies do emerge variously in different geographies; and in the
geographic south, meaningful epistemes have undergone suffocations in
histories of domination by forces from northern geographies (Santos, 2007).
By the very ethical principles I take from Fraser, Stengers and others – which
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themselves, if put to work in new spaces, require tests of those spaces – I
affirm that regional ownership of key social-epistemological projects, such as
curriculum, is vital for the future of those whose lives will be subjected to
their regimes. I humbly invite critical examination, from diverse SA-situated
stakeholders, of the thought this article has put towards a problematic-based
curriculum approach, and whether/how it might hold viability and promise for
SA educational praxis.
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